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INTRODUCTION 
Charles Darwin’s theory is often reduced to a single book, On the Origin of Species (1859), 
and its slogan: descent with modification by means of natural selection. Although the range 
of topics treated by Darwinian studies is ever expanding, most of the works written about 
Darwin’s thought take natural selection as its central principle. The figure of Darwin as a 
champion of the hypothetico-deductive method (Ghiselin 1969) leads one to consider him 
as a chamber naturalist. Sheltered from the external world, Darwin elaborates, in The Origin 
of Species, a logical theory of evolution articulated around natural selection. However, 
another aspect of Darwin’s character and thought must be underlined. Indeed, Darwin’s 
career as a naturalist is intrinsically linked and indebted to experiences in the field. From the 
circumnavigation aboard H.M.S. Beagle to his last work on The Formation of Vegetable 
Mould through the Action of Worms (1881), Darwin’s thought remains grounded on his 
personal relationship to nature in general. More precisely, Darwin’s still underestimated 
considerations of the behaviour of non-human animals and human beings are particularly 
rich, opening an all-new range of possible receptions of Darwinian theory (Burkhardt Jr. 
1985; Durant 1985; Richards 1987; Townshend 2009). In this article, I underline one of these 
possible readings of Darwin, matching the naturalist’s thought with deep ecology as defined 
by Arne Naess in his 1973 article “The Shallow and the Deep, Long-Range Ecology 
Movement: A Summary.” 
Although worries about the destruction of ecological systems are absent from Darwin’s 
works, the methodology behind the naturalist’s considerations on animal behaviour is 
compatible with Naess’ deep ecology. Indeed, most of the seven principles developed by 
Naess in his 1973 article agree with Darwinian ethology. In order to make these relations 
evident, a brief introduction to Darwin’s theory of animal behaviour must firstly be given 
before concentrating on the compatibility between Darwinian ethology and Naess’ 
principles of deep ecology. More than a mere historical interest will result from the 
identification of these links between Darwin and Naess. In fact, focusing on the links 
between Darwinian ethology and Naess’ deep ecology contributes to the effort of a larger 
philosophical foundation of ecosophy.   
1. DARWIN’S OVERLOOKED ETHOLOGY 
In his 1985 article on “Darwin on Animal Behaviour and Evolution,” Richard Burkhardt Jr. 
noted that Darwin’s thought on behaviour was largely overlooked. Almost 30 years later, 
the situation has not completely changed. Three main reasons explain the fact that Darwin’s 
thought on behaviour is not explored in its full range. First of all, except for the chapter on 
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instinct, The Origin of Species (1859) does not really address behaviour. Secondly, Darwin’s 
methodology with respect to the study of behaviour seems outdated. Indeed, in the works 
dedicated to behaviour, such as The Descent of Man and Selection in Relation to Sex (1871) 
and The Expression of the Emotions in Man and Animals (1872), Darwin intentionally uses 
both anthropomorphism and anecdotes in order to describe animal behaviour. In short, 
Darwin contradicts Morgan’s canon (Durant 1985, 291-292, 302-303; Burkhardt Jr. 1985, 
328, 348-349, 351; Townshend 2009, 26-27, 102-103, 108, 132-138), developed in 1894 
against George John Romanes (the most fervent defender of Darwinian ethology),1 which 
stipulates that “[i]n no case is an animal activity to be interpreted in terms of higher 
psychological processes if it can be fairly interpreted in terms of processes which stand 
lower in the scale of psychological evolution and development” (Morgan 1895, 53). As 
noted by Dominique Lestel (2001, 19-58; 2011), ethology has been historically founded on a 
realistic-Cartesian paradigm,2 which respects Morgan’s canon, and continues to be 
developed within this framework. Finally, when he addresses issues regarding animal 
behaviour, Darwin extensively uses what has become a dubious principle since Weismann’s 
distinction between soma and germen, i.e. the heredity of habits. In short, the statement 
that Darwin was not at his best in his theory of behaviour seems to be justified with respect 
to modern science (Ghiselin 2003 [1969], 187-213), which explains a certain lack of interest 
from Darwinian scholars concerning this aspect of Darwin’s theory. 
1.1. Habits vs. Instinct  
Corresponding with the double image of Darwin as a chamber naturalist or as a field 
naturalist, two Darwinian approaches of animal behaviour can be identified.3 Indeed, 
Darwin either considers behaviour as mostly instinctive or as mostly habitual.4 Although 
instinctive and habitual behaviour can be phenomenally similar,5 they drastically differ with 
                                                     
1 A selection of Darwin’s notes on animal behaviour, more particularly on his complex theory of instinct, were 
for the first time published by Romanes as an appendix to his volume on Mental Evolution in Animals (1884).  
2 “Contemporary ethology emphasises an approach to the animal which could be characterized as realistic and 
Cartesian. It combines fundamental description of the world with stipulation of the legitimate ways of studying 
it. It supposes that there is a world which is separated from the subject, and that we can provide a genuine 
description of the animal by investigating the causal and mechanical procedures determining animal 
behaviour. The possibility of observation without observers, and the description of an animal as a machine, 
therefore fundamentally define this approach” (Lestel 2011, 83-84) 
3 Although Darwin as a chamber naturalist bases his approach of the animals on material acquired from the 
field, such a distinction is important since it corresponds to two distinct theories: one in line with Morgan’s 
canon, the other contradicting it.  
4 Darwin never clearly defines the concepts ‘instinct’ and ‘habits’. However, habits have a strong Lamarckian 
flavour in Darwin’s works, while instinct has four main characteristics: innateness, fixity, collectivity, ignorance 
of the end (Richards 1987, 83-105).   
5 Darwin’s reflections on animal behaviour in his manuscripts (especially his Sketch [1842], Essay [1844] and 
Natural Selection [1856-1858]), in The Origin of Species and, though less prominently, in The Descent of Man 
and The Expression of the Emotions, always underline the similarities between instinctive and habitual 
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respect to their origin. Instinctive behaviour is the result of selected accidental variations, 
whereas habitual behaviour is based on vegetative or intellectual actions.  
As a chamber naturalist trying to systematise the development of species by means of a 
hypothetico-deductive method,6 Darwin, in The Origin of Species, favours an approach of 
animal behaviour as based on instinct: 
It will be universally admitted that instincts are as important as corporeal 
structure for the welfare of each species, under its present conditions of life. 
Under changed conditions of life, it is at least possible that slight 
modifications of instinct might be profitable to a species; and if it can be 
shown that instincts do vary ever so little, then I can see no difficulty in 
natural selection preserving and continually accumulating variations of 
instinct to any extent that may be profitable. It is thus, as I believe, that all 
the most complex and wonderful instincts have originated. As modifications 
of corporeal structure arise from, and are increased by, use or habit, and are 
diminished or lost by disuse, so I do not doubt it has been with instincts. But I 
believe that the effects of habit are of quite subordinate importance to the 
effects of the natural selection of what may be called accidental variations of 
instincts; that is of variations produced by the same unknown causes which 
produce slight deviations of bodily structure. (Darwin 1859, 209) 
Animal behaviour can be explained with the same mechanisms as the ones accounting for 
physical structures. Advantageous accidental variations are retained by natural selection. 
Such an approach implies a mechanistic account of animal psychology. Indeed, any appeal 
to the will of animals is superfluous.7 The “subordinate importance” of habits with respect 
to animal behaviour is the premise of a much more radical aspect of Darwin’s approach in 
The Origin of Species: reducing the origin of animal behaviour to instincts due to selected 
accidental variations. Indeed, by considering the case of neuter insects, that, by definition, 
cannot transmit their peculiar structures and instincts, Darwin uses community selection for 
the first time and concludes: 
no amount of exercise, or habit, or volition, in the utterly sterile members of 
a community could possibly have affected the structure or instincts of the 
fertile members, which alone leave descendants. I am surprised that no one 
has advanced this demonstrative case of neuter insects, against the well-
known doctrine of Lamarck. (Darwin 1859, 242) 
                                                                                                                                                                     
behaviour. Indeed, habits can lead to instinct-like behaviour through inheritance, which constitutes Darwin’s 
Lamarckism. However, true instincts are issued from the selection of accidental variations. 
6 The debate that tries to determine whether Darwin uses Hershel’s vera causa or Whewell’s consilience of 
induction must be mentioned here. In order to have an idea on these two rival interpretations, see Hodge 
(1977 & 1992) and Ruse (1999, 176-180, 197-198, 235-236). 
7 Such an approach confirms Darwin’s doubt, though somewhat ambivalent, concerning the transforming 
effect of the will in Lamarck’s theory (Richards 1987, 92-95).  
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With the model of the neuter insects, animal behaviour becomes globally determined by 
the biology of each species, ultimately reducible to the action of natural selection. In other 
words, the chapter on instinct of The Origin of Species confirms the interpretation of 
Darwin’s works as compatible with extreme materialism and his image as a champion of the 
hypothetico-deductive method, an image that is challenged by Darwinian ethology, which 
will be defined in the rest of this section. 
The motives behind the strategy adopted in The Origin of Species must be considered. In a 
crucial passage of The Descent of Man, Darwin states that, while writing The Origin of 
Species, he “had two distinct objects in view; firstly, to show that species had not been 
separately created, and secondly, that natural selection had been the chief agent of change” 
(Darwin 1874, 62). The true status of The Origin of Species is clearly revealed: by defending 
transmutationism, Darwin writes a manifesto, prone to exaggerations. However, Darwin 
immediately adds that natural selection is “largely aided by the inherited effects of habit, 
and slightly by the direct action of the surrounding conditions” (Darwin 1874, 62), a 
concession announcing a switch inherent to his ethology. Indeed, a closer look at the 
vegetal and animal realms, which can only be operated on the field through a direct 
experience with the environment,8 requires a somewhat less systematic account than the 
one strategically preferred in The Origin of Species. Therefore, the reintroduction of 
vegetative and intellectual habits becomes necessary in order to explain complex features in 
plants and peculiar animal actions. Most of Darwin’s works post-Origin thus show a radically 
different argumentative style, incompatible with the interpretation of Darwin as an extreme 
materialist and champion of hypothetico-deductive method, especially when it comes to the 
description of animal behaviour. In conformity with his manuscripts, Darwin uses numerous 
examples and anecdotes, describing animal behaviour in anthropomorphic terms.9 It is 
precisely because of its anthropomorphic approach (Burkhardt Jr. 1985; Durant 1985; 
Townshend 2009) and because of its rejection of the Realist-Cartesian model praised by the 
philosophy of biology (Ghiselin 1969) and mainstream ethology (Lestel 2011) that Darwinian 
field ethology is generally overlooked.  
1.2. The Domain of the Useless 
As Durant notes, Darwin’s theory (of behaviour) has two complementary sides, i.e. 
“zoomorphic anthropology and anthropomorphic zoology” (Durant 1985, 302). It is by 
                                                     
8 Darwin’s sources are both direct and indirect. Five years of circumnavigation have provided him enough data 
for a lifelong research, completed by years of observations of domestic animals (Townshend 2009) and 
testimonies from diverse scientific and unscientific figures, such as zookeepers, hunters or breeders (Secord 
1985). 
9 The second part of The Descent of Man dedicated to sexual selection illustrates the anthropomorphism 
inherent to Darwinian ethology. For instance, Darwin draws parallels between birds courtship and “young 
rustics at a fair courting a pretty girl” (Darwin 1874, 421).  
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analysing some peculiar animal actions through anthropomorphic analogy that Darwin 
identifies what can be called the domain of the useless: 
It is, as I can now see, probable that all organic beings, including man, 
possess peculiarities of structure, which neither are now, nor were formerly 
of any service to them, and which, therefore, are of no physiological 
importance. We know not what produces the numberless slight differences 
between the individuals of each species, for reversion only carries the 
problem a few steps backwards; but each peculiarity must have had its 
efficient cause. If these causes, whatever they may be, were to act more 
uniformly and energetically during a lengthened period (and against this no 
reason can be assigned), the result would probably be not a mere slight 
individual difference, but a well-marked and constant modification, though 
one of no physiological importance. Changed structures, which are in no way 
beneficial, cannot be kept uniform through natural selection, though the 
injurious will be thus eliminated. Uniformity of character would, however, 
naturally follow from the assumed uniformity of the exciting causes, and 
likewise from the free intercrossing of many individuals. During successive 
periods, the same organism might in this manner acquire successive 
modifications, which would be transmitted in a nearly uniform state as long 
as the exciting causes remained the same and there was free intercrossing. 
With respect to the exciting causes we can only say, as when speaking of so-
called spontaneous variations, that they relate much more closely to the 
constitution of the varying organism, than to the nature of the conditions to 
which it has been subjected. (Darwin 1874, 62) 
The observation of animals leads the field naturalist to recognise some structures and 
behaviour that present no advantage with respect to immediate individual survival. Since 
Darwin is not a precursor of sociobiology,10 he concludes that such peculiarities are 
inaccessible to natural selection. Although the two-step model (spontaneous variations and 
selection) (Hoquet 2009) on which the theory of natural selection is based seems to be 
retained in the previous extract, a much more radical and Lamarckian or pre-Baldwinian11 
                                                     
10 Many of the structures and behaviour presenting no advantage with respect to (individual) survival are 
useful when reproduction or social cohesion (and survival) is taken into account. Therefore, some (Cronin 
1991) have interpreted Darwin’s theory of sexual selection, which I consider as a paradigmatic example of the 
domain of the useless, as a premise of a Fisherian account of sexual behaviour. However, as noted by Mayr 
(1972), Darwin strictly differentiates natural selection and sexual selection. In short, sexual selection is not a 
particular case of natural selection for Darwin. With respect to social behaviour, and more particularly 
altruistic actions, I propose a radicalisation of Tort’s theory. Indeed, Tort (2008) argues for a transformation of 
the model of natural selection from the survival of the fittest to the survival of the weakest. I argue for what 
could be called a deselection of natural selection, the selective power having been transferred to the animal 
itself. Note that any genetic interpretation of Darwin, even insisting on altruism (for example Judson 2007) is 
not applicable to Darwinian ethology.  
11 By introducing “A New Factor in Evolution”, Baldwin (1896) develops an alternative to both a Lamarckian 
and a radically Darwinian (or should we rather say Wallacian) account of animal behaviour. Indeed, his theory 
of organic selection aims to explain facts that cannot be the result of natural selection and traditionally require 
the use of the heredity of habits. Organic selection (or ‘Baldwin effect’) confirms the transfer of the selective 
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model is favoured in the examples selected in the second part of The Descent of Man and in 
The Expression of the Emotions. As a consequence, the role of natural selection is drastically 
modified. From a positive and creative principle, natural selection becomes a negative and 
eliminative principle,12 the positive and creative selective power having been transferred to 
the animal itself, as in Baldwin’s organic selection.13  
1.3. A limitation of Natural Selection 
Several crucial elements with respect to the links between Darwin’s theory and deep 
ecology have to be underlined from the very brief introduction to Darwinian ethology given 
in this first section. Firstly, Darwinian ethology has to be distinguished from the 
mainstream14 interpretation of Darwin’s theory. More precisely, Darwinian ethology cannot 
be based on the radical interpretation of The Origin of Species summarised by the slogan 
‘descent with modification by means of natural selection’. Secondly, in order to make 
Darwinian ethology apparent, it is necessary to overcome a certain reticence towards an 
apparently outdated methodology. As a result, reading Darwin’s account of animal 
behaviour can lead one to question the realist-Cartesian paradigm in which ethology has 
been developed.  
Far from being deprived of any systematic method, Darwinian ethology can be centred on a 
single theoretical movement: the limitation of natural selection. Such argumentative 
movement, which contradicts the aim of The Origin of Species, operates on several levels. 
On the one hand, the hermeneutic power of natural selection is diminished. Indeed, natural 
selection is not a sufficient cause that explains the majority of natural phenomena, 
particularly with respect to animal behaviour. Such a conclusion is significant in The Descent 
of Man, specifically when Darwin addresses sexual selection, and found throughout The 
Expression of the Emotions, directly contradicting the program of The Origin, which is 
reflected in its structure (Hodge 1977 & 1992). The domain of the useless characterises and 
gathers the phenomena inaccessible to natural selection. On the other hand, natural 
selection has to be redefined. Since the animal itself possesses a creative and positive 
                                                                                                                                                                     
power to the animal and the transformation of natural selection from a positive, creative principle to a 
negative, eliminative principle.  
12 As noted by Hoquet (2009), determining whether natural selection is a positive and creative principle or a 
negative and eliminative principle is a key to the interpretation of Darwin’s entire theory.  
13 Sexual selection is a good example of the transfer of the selective power to the animals. According to 
Darwin, it is through conscious choice that females choose certain males that have consciously learned how to 
display their often harmful ornaments. Contrarily to what Diehm seems to suggest, Darwin does not situate 
“nature outside the sphere of purpose and agency” (Diehm 2014, 83). Indeed, Darwinian ethology, by 
transferring the selective power to the animals, insist on their agency.  
14 I do not deny the diversity and complexity of Darwinian studies. However, a certain tendency, from Darwin 
scholars, to concentrate on The Origin of Species and on natural selection is undeniable. As noted by Fodor and 
Piattelli-Palmarini (2010, xvi), such reductive interpretation of Darwin is even more present in other fields that 
use the theory of natural selection without focusing on Darwin’s works. 
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selective power in phenomena belonging to the domain of the useless, natural selection is 
limited to a negative, eliminative principle, operating when the animal fails to adopt an 
adequate behaviour with respect to mere survival.   
Taking Darwinian ethology seriously leads to two main complementary practical 
consequences. Firstly, a purely logical, systematic approach of animal behaviour is 
precluded.15 In other words, direct fieldwork, contact with the environment, is compulsory. 
Secondly, such fieldwork necessitates an anthropomorphic approach in order to avoid 
anthropocentrism. Indeed, anthropomorphism and anthropocentrism are mutually 
exclusive, which is particularly well illustrated in the case of Darwinian ethology. 
Anthropocentrism consists in believing that human beings are the most significant species. 
A hierarchical approach of the environment, with human beings on top of it, characterises 
anthropocentrism. An anthropocentric approach requires a movement towards human 
beings, precluding any identification with the other species and resulting in detachment 
from the animals. On the contrary, a process of identification necessarily accompanies 
anthropomorphism, which consists in attributing human characteristics, and particularly 
human feelings, to animals. An anthropomorphic approach requires a movement towards 
the animals. Darwinian ethology precludes anthropocentrism by arguing for knowledge of 
the animals based on anecdotes in anthropomorphic terms. Contrary to what could be 
implied by the theory developed in The Origin of Species, a purely hierarchical approach is 
undermined by Darwinian ethology. Rather than the ‘tree of life’, Darwin being reluctant to 
use this metaphor (Hoquet 2009), the entire animal realm is included in a ‘coral of life’, its 
branches growing in different directions. Thus, most human characteristics are identified in 
animals, not as traits that are lesser and/or antecedent to those in humans, which would 
correspond to a hierarchical view, but as distinct expressions of the same characteristics.  
Both Darwin’s theoretical movement away from natural selection and its practical 
consequences (a necessity of field work and anthropomorphism) allow drawing links 
between Darwinian ethology and Naess’ definition of deep ecology.     
2. DARWINIAN ETHOLOGY AND NAESS’ SEVEN PRINCIPLES OF DEEP ECOLOGY 
In his now famous 1973 article “The Shallow and the Deep, Long-Range Ecology Movement: 
A Summary,” Naess identifies seven principles framing deep ecology. Although never cited, 
the compatibility of Naess’ theory with that of Darwin, and more precisely Darwinian 
ethology, is striking. Indeed, most of Naess’ normative principles are in accordance with 
Darwin’s theoretical approach of animal behaviour. The following section is dedicated to 
showing the compatibility between Darwinian ethology and the seven principles developed 
by Naess. Although Naess’ normative principles exceed Darwin’s theoretical views with 
respect to strictly ecological considerations, Darwinian ethology is compatible with Naess’ 
                                                     
15 Such an approach corresponds to the image of Darwin as a chamber naturalist. 
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practical deep ecology and is not itself devoid of practical consideration. The previous 
section has shown that the development of other theoretical principles than natural 
selection by the recognition of the domain of the useless leads to the exigency of fieldwork 
and to the use of anthropomorphism to account, in a non-hierarchical approach of the 
animal realm, for anecdotes witnessed on the field. 
2.1. Theoretical Considerations: “The Relational, Total-Field Image”, 
“Principles of Diversity and of Symbiosis”, “Complexity, not Complication” 
Among Naess’ seven principles, the “[r]ejection of the man-in-environment image in favour 
of the relational, total-field image” (Naess, 1973: 95) can be considered as architectonic and 
illustrative of the change of paradigm necessary for the foundation of deep ecology. 
According to this principle, every organism is defined by its relations with other organisms:  
Organisms as knots in the biospherical net or field of intrinsic relations. An 
intrinsic relation between two things A and B is such that the relation belongs 
to the definitions or basic constitutions of A and B, so that without the 
relation, A and B are no longer the same things. (Naess 1973, 95) 
The relational, total-field image can be looked at from several points of view leading to the 
very same conclusion: the definition of any organism is negative. Indeed, breaking with the 
anthropocentric approach of the environment, Naess’ first principle not only leads one to 
challenge the prominent position traditionally given to human beings, but also to question 
the definition of every living being. By refusing the “thing-in-milieu concept” (Naess 1973, 
95), Naess adopts a radical non-essentialist approach of species. However, rather than 
defending a nominalist definition of species, Naess’ approach to living beings can be linked 
to Saussure’s definition of the linguistic sign. Indeed, every living being is co-determined by 
its living surroundings. In other words, the relational, total-field image is a differential 
system: while every being is negatively defined by its relationships with others, positivity 
only results from the sum of all these relations between organisms.  
Following Saussure’s terminology, and therefore applying a structuralist approach to the 
living beings, the differential system representing the relational, total-field image can be 
qualified as synchronic. A synchronic understanding of the living beings means that 
knowledge of organisms is obtained through the consideration of the state of relations 
between the living beings.  Let us take an example: an organism (A) can only be defined 
through its relations with other organisms (B, C,…) in a given state (S). In other words, any 
organism in the state (S) is negatively defined by its relations with the other organisms in 
the same given state (S). In summary, a synchronic approach is necessarily based on a 
differential system that applies to a specific state (S) and negatively defines elements 
(A,B,C…) through their relations as opposed to defining them positively through essential 
traits (see fig. 1). 
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(fig. 1.) 
Synchrony, i.e. applying a differential system to the study of living beings, is perfectly 
compatible with the theory of The Origin of Species16 and therefore seems to undermine the 
necessity of Darwinian ethology. Indeed, considered as a positive and creative principle, 
natural selection differentially organises the relations between species in a given state, i.e. 
ecological niche.17 As Naess states while explaining his principle of complexity: 
Organisms, ways of life, and interactions in the biosphere in general, exhibit 
complexity of such an astoundingly high level as to colour the general 
outlook of ecologists. Such complexity makes thinking in terms of vast 
systems inevitable. (Naess 1973, 97) 
Complexity leads to the elaboration of vast systems. Such necessity can be interpreted, on 
face value, as an argument for a purely synchronic approach. Indeed, complexity requires 
thinking synchronically, i.e. through a differential system, which confirms the approach of 
the relational, total-field image. The compatibility between such synchronic representation 
of the biosphere and natural selection must be underlined, both historically and 
theoretically. In The Origin of Species, Darwin organises his theory around natural selection, 
satisfying Victorian philosophy of science (Hodge 1977 & 1992; Ruse 1999). Within the 
realist-Cartesian paradigm, natural selection still appears as a convenient, though arguably 
reductive, organising principle. However, complexity cannot be entirely understood through 
synchronic systems organised around natural selection. As Naess underlines, complexity 
leads to “a keen, steady perception of the profound human ignorance of biospherical 
relationships” (Naess 1973, 97). In other words, the relational, total-field image, allied with 
the principle of complexity understood in its entirety, require altering a purely synchronic 
approach of the living beings. In other words, elaborating vast differential systems cannot 
                                                     
16 Röllin (1980) considers that Saussurean synchrony can be associated with natural selection, whereas 
Saussurean diachrony corresponds with accidental variations.  
17 Ospovat (1995 [1981], 170-209) shows how Milne-Edwards’ division of labour influences the long 
development of Darwin’s theory of natural selection, notably through the discovery of the principle of 
divergence. 
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represent the complexity of biospherical relationships. In Darwinian terms, considering 
living beings through natural selection as the sole organising principle does not match the 
diversity of natural phenomena. Darwinian ethology precisely answers the need to 
overcome a purely synchronic, systematic approach to the living beings based on a 
differential system organised around natural selection. 
By limiting natural selection, notably through the development of the domain of the useless, 
Darwinian ethology undermines the all-sufficiency of a synchronic description of the 
biosphere. It can be argued that Darwinian ethology is intrinsically panchronic. A panchronic 
approach takes into account both diachrony and synchrony. Whereas synchrony considers a 
state comprising several units (see fig.1), diachrony focuses on the history of a particular 
unit over time. A diachronic study of an organism (A) would focus on its different 
modifications (A’, A’’, …) over time (T, T1,T2, …), without considering other elements (see 
fig.2). 
     A (T) 
 
 
 
     A’ (T1) 
     
 
 
          A’’ (T2) 
             (Fig.2) 
In the context of Darwinian ethology and the relational, total-field image, panchrony 
requires the study of the history of individuals in order to understand the state of their 
relationships. As Lestel notes in the description of the bi-constructivist18 approach of the 
animal, which can be linked to Darwinian ethology, “each animal represents the crossroads 
of three lines of history – phylogenetic, cultural and individual – differing in their 
importance” (Lestel 2011, 84). Animal behaviour is thus influenced by a triple contingency: 
biological19, cultural and circumstantial.20 These three lines of history automatically lead to 
                                                     
18 By considering the complex relations that motivate animal action, Darwinian ethology is similar to bi-
constructivism, which requires the elaboration of a model able “to understand how to construct the way the 
animal constructs its world” (Lestel 2011, 84) and implies the refusal of more simple and systematic 
explanations such as ethograms. 
19 Biological contingency corresponds to the phylogenetic history of the animal, i.e. the evolution of its species 
over time. 
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the study of panchrony, i.e. of the successive states of relationships the individual crosses. 
In short, Darwinian ethology, or its more modern form, bi-constructivism, is necessarily 
panchronic, a diachronic or synchronic approach being necessary but not sufficient.  
Panchrony is not only present in Darwin’s post-Origin works, but can also be identified in his 
manuscripts, notably in Natural Selection, the draft of the second part of the Species book 
that Darwin intended to write before being compelled to summarise his theory.21 Still 
influenced by his experiences on the field, Darwin does not hesitate to anthropomorphise 
animal behaviour, using diachronic principles (mainly the heredity of habits) while taking 
into account synchronic states. The acquisition of fear is one of the most documented 
examples illustrating the panchronic approach of Darwinian ethology:  
I have already discussed the hereditary tameness of our domesticated 
animals: from what follows I have no doubt that the fear of man has always 
first to be acquired in a state of nature, & that under domestication it only is 
lost again. In all the few archipelagos & islands uninhabited by man, of which 
I have been able to find an early account, the native animals were entirely 
void of fear of man: I have ascertained this in six cases in the most distant 
parts of the world, & with birds & animals of the most different kinds. <Old 
Dom Pernety says that the Ducks & Geese at the Falkland Islands walked 
before them as if mad [sic; Pernety wrote 'prives i.e. tame.]> At the 
Galapagos Islands I pushed a hawk off a tree with the muzzle of my gun, & 
the little birds drank water out of a vessel which I held in my hand. But I have 
in my Journal given details on this subject; & I will here only remark that the 
tameness is not general, but is special towards man: for at the Falklands, the 
Geese build on the outlying islets on account of the foxes. These wolf-like 
foxes were here, as fearless of man, as were the birds; & the sailors in 
Byron's voyage, mistaking their curiosity for fierceness ran into the water to 
avoid them: in all old/civilised countries, the wariness & fear of even young 
foxes & wolves is well known. At the Galapagos Islands the great land-lizards 
(Amblyrhynchus) were extremely tame so that I could pull them by the tail 
whereas in other parts of the world large lizards are wary enough. The 
aquatic lizard of this same genus, lives on the coast-rocks, is adapted to swim 
& dive perfectly, & feeds on submerged algae: no doubt it must be exposed 
to danger from the sharks; & consequently, though quite tame on the land, 
yet I could not drive them into the water & when I threw them in, they 
always swam directly back to the shore: see what a contrast with all 
amphibious animals in Europe, which, when disturbed by the more 
dangerous animal, man, instinctively & instantly take to the water. 
                                                                                                                                                                     
20 Behaviour is considered as cultural when biology and/or the environment do not determine it. In addition 
Lestel (2001, 368) adds another criterion, i.e. that the animal elaborates meaning with respect to its actions, 
which requires considering the animal as a hermeneutical subject.  
21 Darwin wrote The Origin of Species in haste because Wallace was on the verge of publishing a similar theory 
of natural selection. 
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The tameness of the birds at the Falklands is particularly interesting, because 
most of the very same species, more especially the larger birds, are 
excessively wild in Tierra del Fuego, where for generations they have been 
persecuted by the savages. Both at these islands & at the Galapagos, it is 
particularly note-worthy, as I have shown in my Journal by the comparison of 
the several accounts up to the time when we visited these islands, that the 
birds are gradually getting less & less tame; & it is surprising, considering the 
degree of persecution which they have occasionally suffered during the last 
one or two centuries, that they have not become wilder; it shows that the 
fear of man is not soon acquired. (Darwin in Stauffer 1975, 495-496) 
From his observations on the field, Darwin concludes that fear can be acquired. The 
vocabulary of heredity and acquisition, rather than the use of terms such as ‘variation’ and 
‘selection’, is typical of Darwin’s interpretation and use of the heredity of habits,22 Such 
diachronic principle automatically leads to the consideration of synchrony through the three 
lines of history identified by Lestel (2011). Framed by its phylogenetic history, i.e. by its 
biological heritage, the animal can acquire fear with respect to its own individual experience 
(its relations with other species) or its cultural heritage (in this case, the fear individually 
acquired and collectively transmitted by its predecessors). In sum, the acquisition of fear 
illustrates that the complexity of biospherical relations inherent to the relational, total-field 
image cannot be grasped by a synchronic approach, notably unified around a single 
principle – natural selection – but has to take into account the different histories of such 
relations through an approach that can be qualified as panchronic since diachronic and 
synchronic considerations are necessarily intermingled.  
Within Darwinian ethology, the limitation of synchrony, and by extension the limitation of 
natural selection, leads to the consideration of the domain of the useless, i.e. the study of 
non-adaptive and anti-adaptive structures and behaviour. Among them, expressive 
movements represent a particularly interesting case. Indeed, Darwin’s theory of expression 
allows drawing further links with Naess’ deep ecology, more particularly with the principles 
of diversity and symbiosis:  
Diversity enhances the potentialities of survival, the chances of new modes of 
life, the richness of forms. And the so-called struggle of life, and survival of 
the fittest, should be interpreted in the sense of ability to coexist and 
cooperate in complex relationships, rather than ability to kill, exploit, and 
suppress. 'Live and let live' is a more powerful ecological principle than 
'Either you or me'. (Naess 1973, 96) 
As in the case of synchrony, the principles of diversity and symbiosis are compatible with 
the theory developed in The Origin of Species and seem to undermine the necessity of 
Darwinian ethology. For instance, the analogy with Milne-Edwards’ division of labour leads 
                                                     
22 In order to avoid criticisms inherent to the heredity of habits, one can make a Baldwinian interpretation of 
such passages and substitute the heredity of habits with organic selection.  
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Darwin to recognise the advantages of diversity within a given niche with respect to the 
proliferation of species (Ospovat 1995 [1981], 170-209). Furthermore, cooperation is 
introduced with community selection and opens a wide range of interpretations that, 
whether strictly limited to Darwin’s works or not, are based on an extended definition of 
natural selection.23 However, Darwin’s considerations of cooperation are mainly developed 
in The Descent of Man and should therefore be read through the prism of Darwinian 
ethology, i.e. outside of the reach of natural selection.24 Moreover, the interpretation of 
biospherical relationships in terms of coexistence finds an historical and theoretical 
foundation in Darwin’s theory of expression.   
Developed in The Expression of the Emotions in Man and Animals, Darwin’s thoughts on 
expressive movements are entirely based on the heredity of (intelligent) habits,25 
confirming the transfer of selective power to animals. According to Darwin, when expressive 
movements are not the result of the constitution of the nervous system, they are generally 
automatized or transmitted habits that were at first individually and consciously developed 
as reactions to the surrounding conditions.26 The expression of anger in dogs illustrates 
Darwin’s approach: 
I have already described the appearance of a dog approaching another dog 
with hostile intentions, namely, with erected ears, eyes intently directed 
forwards, hair on the neck and back bristling, gait remarkably stiff, with the 
tail upright and rigid. So familiar is this appearance to us, that an angry man 
is sometimes said “to have his back up.” Of the above points, the stiff gait 
and upright tail alone require further discussion. Sir C. Bell remarks1 that, 
when a tiger or wolf is struck by its keeper and is suddenly roused to ferocity, 
"every muscle is in tension, and the limbs are in an attitude of strained 
exertion, prepared to spring." This tension of the muscles and consequent 
stiff gait may be accounted for on the principle of associated habit, for anger 
                                                     
23 For example, one can think of Cronin’s (1991) interpretation based on game theory, Tort’s (2008) theory of 
the reverse effect of evolution or De Waal (2009) theory of empathy. 
24 Darwin develops three possible explanations for the emergence of cooperative and altruistic behaviour: 
calculated interest, fear of opinion and community selection. Since this theory is developed in The Descent of 
Man, i.e. in the book where Darwin amends the excessive use of natural selection, it can be argued that the 
appeal to community selection is mainly a way to answer criticisms, notably exposed by the eugenicists Greg 
and Galton, against the capacity of natural selection to be effective in more advanced states of society. 
25 The expression of the emotions can be considered as useless (Richards 1987, 230) and the exclusive appeal 
to the heredity of habits, contrarily to what some interpretations suggest (Ekman 1973, 1-6), confers to such 
theory an apparently un-Darwinian flavour (Radick 2010).  
26 Darwin uses three principles in order account of expressive movements: “The principle of serviceable 
associated Habits,” “The principle of Antithesis,” and “The principle of actions due to the constitution of the 
Nervous System, independently from the first of the Will, and independently to a certain extent of Habit.” 
These three principles are not within the reach of natural selection and require the adoption of Darwinian 
ethology.  
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has continually led to fierce struggles, and consequently to all the muscles of 
the body having been violently exerted. (Darwin 1890, 122) 
Confrontations that follow angry feelings have led to the automatization of voluntary bodily 
movements that are characteristic of struggles. Hence, the bodily expression of anger 
indicates the dog’s hostility through a possible future outcome of the encounter. However, 
such outcome is not necessary and the expression of anger opens what can be considered 
as a space of negotiation. In short, hostile feelings do not automatically lead to aggression, 
depending on the reaction of the individual, who triggered anger, to the information 
provided by the expressive movements.  
The space of negotiation identified in the precise case of the expression of anger can be 
extended to animal relations in general. Indeed, through anthropomorphic anecdotes, 
Darwinian ethology describes and generalises animal actions as negotiations for every 
particular aspect of life: survival, reproduction, social position. While males try to persuade 
females to share an initially personal pleasure,27 every individual tries, consciously or 
unconsciously, to avoid dangerous confrontations and to obtain the most suitable social 
position through actions, i.e. negotiations such as inherited expressive movements, 
seductive patterns or intelligent reactions. Even cooperation can be considered as a 
particular case of negotiation. As Darwin notes in his explanation of the development of 
moral faculties in the case of man, cooperation can be motivated by the hope of a future 
advantage and the fear of opinion. The importance of language in the latter case represents 
a perfect continuity with the role played by expressive movements in more basic examples 
of negotiations.   
In sum, in its description of animal actions as negotiations, Darwinian ethology theoretically 
supports the relational, total-field image. Indeed, animal relations appear to be more 
complex than simple predation interactions and are central in such a description of the 
animal realm that is not based on elimination through natural selection. ‘Live and let live’ 
seems to be the conduct aimed at by animals in both interspecific and intraspecific 
relations, which leads to the consideration of the more normative principles present in both 
Naess’ deep ecology and Darwin’s ethology.  
2.2. Normative Considerations: “Biospherical Egalitarianism”, “Anti-Class 
Posture”, “Local Autonomy and Decentralization”  
Among the more normative principles developed by Naess, “[b]iospherical egalitarianism” is 
central: 
                                                     
27 “Sufficient facts have now been given to shew with what care male birds display their various charms, and 
this they do with the utmost skill. Whilst preening their feathers, they have frequent opportunities for 
admiring themselves, and of studying how best to exhibit their beauty. But as all the males of the same species 
display themselves in exactly the same manner, it appears that actions, at first perhaps intentional, have 
become instinctive” (Darwin 1874, 402). 
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The ecological field-worker acquires a deep-seated respect, or even 
veneration, for ways and forms of life. He reaches an understanding from 
within, a kind of understanding that others reserve for fellow men and for a 
narrow section of ways and forms of life. To the ecological field-worker, the 
equal right to live and blossom is an intuitively clear and obvious value axiom. 
Its restriction to humans is an anthropocentrism with detrimental effects 
upon the life quality of humans themselves. This quality depends in part 
upon the deep pleasure and satisfaction we receive from close partnership 
with other forms of life. The attempt to ignore our dependence and to 
establish a master-slave role has contributed to the alienation of man from 
himself. (Naess 1973, 95-96) 
Following the relational, total-field image, Naess’ biospherical egalitarianism as a foundation 
of the normative character of deep ecology has a certain Kantian flavour, inequality of 
treatment with respect to non-human living beings leading to both moral and practical 
damage for humanity. Therefore, deep ecology is necessarily anti-anthropocentrist. 
Accepting and integrating his encounters with other living beings, the ecological field-
worker realises the necessity of equality among the biosphere and automatically adopts the 
‘live and let live’ motto.  
The links between Naess’ biospherical egalitarianism and Darwin are twofold, theoretical 
and practical. Indeed, Darwinian ethology is based on anecdotes, collected during fieldwork 
(Secord 1985, 519-542; Townshend 2009, 26-27, 81-82, 102-103, 108, 132-138), and refutes 
anthropocentrism through the application of anthropomorphism (Durant 1985, 291-292, 
302-303; Burkhardt Jr. 1985, 328, 348-349, 351).28 According to Darwin, the long 
development of morality itself results in an inclusion of other species, which makes 
anthropocentrism a mere temporary accident in human history. Such theoretical 
considerations reflect more practical and personal opinions on human-animal relationships 
expressed more freely in Darwin’s manuscripts: 
Animals whom we have made our slaves we do not like to consider our 
equals. — Do not slave holders wish to make the black man other kind—
animals with affections, imitation, fear of death, pain, sorrow for the dead—
respect. (Darwin in Barret et al. 2008 [1987], B, 231) 
Studying animals leads Darwin, the field naturalist still influenced by his recent 
circumnavigation aboard H.M.S. Beagle, to attribute human feelings and states of mind to 
non-human beings, evidence of an undeniable anthropomorphic approach that contradicts 
anthropocentrism. Inferring that animals are capable of such feelings from their action 
                                                     
28 Anthropocentrism is precluded in an anthropomorphic approach that leads to an identification with the 
observed and studied animals. Diehm (2014) underlines the importance of identification in Naess’ deep 
ecology. By considering Darwinian ethology, identification with the animals appears as central to Darwin’s 
thought, which leads to consider Darwin’s work more a boon than a bane to Naess, contrarily to what Diem 
(2014, 85) suggests.   
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requires an analogical projection from the observer that, according to Darwin, must be 
associated with the respect due to our equals. Disrespect towards animals is therefore as 
unjustified as slavery, which is based on flawed essentialist arguments. As Darwin and his 
family were long-time abolitionists (Desmond & Moore 2009), the reference to slavery 
testifies to the importance of the human-animal relations issue for Darwin. In short, equality 
ought to be as much interspecific as intraspecific. Such a normative principle finds an echo 
in Naess’ “[a]nti-class posture” (Naess 1973, 96): biospherical egalitarianism ought to be 
applied for any kind of relation within the biosphere.  
Finally, even the most political sides of Naess’ deep ecology echo some aspects of Darwin’s 
theory. Indeed, the “[l]ocal autonomy and decentralization” (Naess 1973, 98) can be linked 
with a well-known and accepted Darwinian proposition, which does not require 
consideration of Darwinian ethology: 
The vulnerability of a form of life is roughly proportional to the weight of 
influences from afar, from outside the local region in which that form has 
obtained an ecological equilibrium. This lends support to our efforts to 
strengthen local self-government and material and mental self-sufficiency. 
But these efforts presuppose an impetus towards decentralization. (Naess 
1973, 98) 
According to Darwin, the division of labour in an ecological niche, a theory inspired by 
Milne-Edwards, allows the development of the greatest number of species. Such division of 
labour leads to a stable state of relations between species that can mainly be threatened by 
the introduction of an external factor to this state.  In Naess’ words, the preservation of any 
ecological equilibrium requires a protection from external influences. In sum, the principle 
of local autonomy and decentralization can be considered as the political application of a 
cardinal aspect of Darwin’s theory largely developed in The Origin of Species, i.e. the division 
of labour in an ecological niche. Local autonomy and decentralization respect the fragile 
equilibrium of political relations, which are comparable to an ecological niche supporting 
the maximum amount of species thanks to the division of labour.   
3. CONCLUSION  
In order to show the compatibility between Darwinian theory and Naess’ deep ecology, it is 
necessary to study Darwinian ethology. It is true that focusing on a very traditional 
interpretation of Darwin’s theory, reduced to The Origin of Species and articulated around 
natural selection, allows us to draw interesting parallels. For instance, Naess’ relational, 
total-field image principle and the more practical local autonomy and decentralization 
principle can both be linked to the synchronic approach privileged on The Origin of Species.   
Nevertheless, a more complete correspondence between Naess’ deep ecology and Darwin’s 
theory appears by the widening of the scope of Darwinian studies and by the development 
of a new interpretation of Darwin’s theory. Focusing on the study of animal behaviour 
appears to be a fruitful angle. Indeed, through the observation of animals, Darwin is led to 
The Trumpeter ISSN 0832-6193 Volume 31, No. 1 (2015) 
Thomas Robert 55 
reduce the influence of natural selection and to give anthropomorphic explanations for 
animal actions providing a better account of the complex relations within the biosphere 
described in Naess’ principles of diversity and of symbiosis and his ‘complexity, not 
complication’ principle. Moreover, Darwinian ethology requires a profound respect for 
animals, gained from fieldwork, that is compatible with the more normative principles 
developed by Naess, such as biospherical egalitarianism and anti-class posture. From this 
perspective, deep ecology is still a developing field, notably compatible with new trends in 
ethology such as bi-constructivism, and as one that contradicts the necessarily 
anthropocentric realist-Cartesian paradigm. In sum, Darwin’s theory, and more particularly 
Darwinian ethology, can be a key to a philosophical defence of deep ecology.  
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